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Earnings-Tenure Profiles: Tests of Agency and Human Capital 
Theories using Individual Performance Data 
 
I. Introduction 
The existence of upward-sloping earnings tenure profiles is one of the most often 
observed empirical regularities in the field of labor economics around the world (for 
empirical surveys see, for example, Hutchens, 1989; Topel, 1991.) At the same time, the 
explanation for this observed regularity remains highly controversial with sharp 
disagreement surrounding, in particular, the respective roles of human capital and agency 
theories (e.g. Heckman, Lochner and Todd., 2005 and Altonji and Williams, 2005.) To a 
large degree, as in many areas in economics, the persistence of disputes reflects a sharp 
disconnect between key theoretical propositions and the data that are available to test 
these hypotheses—the gains from advances in econometric techniques and theory have 
been muted because of limited data (Griliches, 1994:2.) In this paper our use of new 
micro data that we have gathered enables us to undertake an econometric case study and 
provide some of the most rigorous evidence to date on several related dimensions of 
enduring debates surrounding upward sloping earnings-tenure profiles. 
 A primary interest concerns the field of human capital. That theory, as developed 
for example by Becker (1964), offers a well-known explanation for upward-sloping 
earnings-tenure profiles. While human capital has various forms, the main types are 
formal education and on-the-job-training. In turn, on-the-job-training involves employees 
learning both from formal training programs as well as via informal knowledge 
acquisition on the job (including both learning by doing and knowledge transfer from 
peers at their workplaces).  As the worker spends more time on the job with the firm, her 
human capital (specific and general) will grow and hence her performance will improve. 
 2
(For a discussion of the links between tenure, training and the formation of human capital 
see, e.g., Ryan, 2001, Lazear, 1998 ch. 6, and Koike, 2005 chs. 1-3). Thus, human capital 
theorists stress the importance of a worker’s human capital accumulation through on-the-
job training, and view his/her tenure as a good proxy for the level of human capital he/she 
has accumulated through on-the-job training. As such, the upward-sloping earnings-
tenure profiles are interpreted as indicating that wages will rise with tenure because 
workers with longer tenure have more human capital (see, for instance, Hashimoto, 1981) 
By contrast, agency theorists explain the phenomenon as a form of deferred 
compensation used to motivate employees and limit shirking. Upward-sloping earnings-
tenure profiles, combined with a termination contract stipulating that shirking workers, if 
caught, will be fired are expected to provide sufficient incentives for workers not to shirk. 
In other words, shirking workers will face a sufficiently high probability of forfeiting an 
opportunity to receive a higher wage. For agency theorists, even after each worker’s 
human capital is perfectly measured and controlled for, econometricians will still obverse 
upward-sloping earnings-tenure profiles (See, for example, Lazear, 1979, and Lazear and 
Moore, 1984 for this alternative agency theory).1 
A simple and direct test of the relative validity of the two competing explanations 
is to estimate earnings-tenure profiles, and see if the earnings-tenure profiles are still 
sufficiently upward-sloping even after individual worker performance is controlled for. 
Nonetheless, such simple direct tests are extraordinarily scarce. In large part this is due to 
the limited availability of reliable individual worker performance data. A notable 
                                                 
1 There is also a matching model interpretation of the upward-sloping earnings-tenure 
profiles (Jovanovic, 1979). For surveys of the empirical literature see, for example, Hutchens 
(1987and 1989). 
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exception is Medoff and Abraham (1980) who use personnel records on all managerial 
and professional employees from two large manufacturing firms in the U.S. and provide 
evidence in favor of agency theorists. However, as the authors themselves acknowledge, 
a possible limitation of the study is the use of subjective performance evaluations as a 
measure of individual worker performance.2  
It is against this backdrop that the key objective of this paper becomes clear. We 
use objective worker performance data to provide the first direct test of the relative 
validity of two competing explanations of upward-sloping earnings-tenure profiles.  
Our empirical work is facilitated by our gaining rare access to individual records 
for all weavers who worked at any time during a year-long period at a textile firm 
(CHINATEXTILE) in the interesting case of China. We learned from our extensive field 
research at CHINATEXTILE over the last three years3 that CHINATEXTILE views 
output quality as the most important worker performance measure, and collects each 
weaver’s defect rate (percentage of defective output produced by each weaver per week) 
consistently. We were able to persuade CHINATEXTILE to grant us full access to the 
crucial worker performance data as well as other personnel records (such as earnings and 
tenure) for all weavers during the 53-week period from the first week of April of 2003 to 
the last week of March of 2004. 
                                                 
2 A number of innovative attempts have been made to overcome the lack of individual 
worker performance data and test the relative validity of the two competing theories indirectly by 
estimating production functions using firm-level or establishment-level data and deriving  
productivity-tenure profiles (see, for instance, Hellerstein and Neumark, 1995 and 2004 and 
Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske, 1999, and Fukao, et. al., 2006).     
3 Our approach is that of an econometric case study. For surveys of studies of this class 
see, for example, Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) and Jones, Kalmi and Kauhanen (2006). 
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One of the two other, secondary questions we address concerns the impact of 
employee share ownership on earnings-tenure profiles. Ownership of shares by 
employees is a phenomenon that has grown rapidly in recent years around the world, 
including advanced capitalist economies (see for example Blasi and Kruse, 1991, and 
Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein, 2003). There has also been a surprising amount of employee 
ownership in China (e.g. Tseo,  Hou , Zhang  and Zhang ,2004) as well as in the former 
centrally planned economies where it has often been introduced as part of a privatization 
strategy (e.g. Uvalic and Vaughan-Whitehead, 1997.) A sizeable theoretical and 
empirical literature has also appeared that examines various issues relating to employee 
ownership, with much work focusing on the implications of employee ownership for 
enterprise productivity and usually finding beneficial productivity effects (e.g. Craig and 
Pencavel, 1995; Jones and Kato, 1995). In accounting for enhanced productivity, it is 
argued that employee ownership tends to align the interest of employees with that of the 
firm. In turn this argument implies that the wage for employee owners may not need to be 
as sensitive to worker performance measures as the wage paid to non-employee owners. 
In fact, total compensation for employee owners may well become excessively variable if 
the sensitivity of their wage to worker performance is as high as that of non-employee 
owners. For the same reason, the earnings-tenure profiles for employee owners may not 
need to be as upward-sloping as for other workers to prevent workers from pursuing their 
own interests at the cost of the well-being of the firm. Such hypotheses, however, remain 
untested.  
Fortunately, at CHINATEXTILE almost 40 percent of the weavers are employee 
owners. Hence our individual data enable us to examine, for the first time, how earnings-
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tenure profiles are affected by employee ownership. Specifically, we can reliably 
estimate the earnings-tenure profiles and the pay-performance sensitivity for employee 
owners and other weavers separately.   
The final question we investigate is how residential polices for urban registrants 
and rural migrant workers can be expected to affect earnings-tenure profiles. Issues 
surrounding the rural/urban divide in the Chinese labor market are recognized as a crucial 
policy issue in China and have attracted much attention in the literature-- see for instance 
Nielsen, et al. (2006) and  Lu and Song (2006.) However, for the most part, empirical 
studies have used firm-level data and the ramifications of policy for matters such as 
earnings-tenure profiles have not been examined. By contrast, our individual data allow 
us to provide rigorous evidence for the first time on whether wage determination within 
the firm differs significantly between urban weavers and rural weavers. Specifically, we 
test two hypotheses. First, the literature on rural/urban divide in the Chinese labor market 
reports that job opportunities for rural migrant workers are more limited than for urban 
workers (for example, the lack of unemployment insurance makes it difficult for rural 
migrant workers to stay in a city and look for a new job). The opportunity cost of shirking 
on the job and getting fired is already quite high for rural migrant workers due to their 
limited alternative job opportunities. As a result, there is less need to make the earnings-
tenure profiles steeper to make the cost of shirking and getting fired sufficiently high to 
prevent worker shirking.  
The second hypothesis concerns the pay-performance linkage. All weavers in our 
sample have the same level of schooling (junior high school). However, due to the school 
quality difference between urban and rural schools, rural migrant workers tend to be less 
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prepared for high quality work than urban workers (as shown later, on average rural 
workers lag behind urban workers in quality).4 The greater pay-performance sensitivity 
for rural workers may serve as a credible signal to rural workers of the importance of 
quality. Furthermore, the greater pay-performance sensitivity means more variable 
earnings and rural migrant workers with more limited alternative employment 
opportunities may be more likely to accept such variable earnings than urban workers. In 
short, we hypothesize that the pay-performance sensitivity may be greater for rural 
migrant workers than for urban registrants.         
The structure of this paper is as follows. The following section provides an 
overview of our case that is accompanied by a presentation of basic descriptive statistics 
of our key variables. This is followed by a brief conceptual review.  In the next two parts 
we detail our empirical strategy and present our findings. In a concluding section we 
consider the implications of our findings.   
 
II. The Case, Data and Descriptive Statistics  
Our case, CHINATEXTILE, is located in an area in which many textile firms are 
to be found in China, Shijiangzhuang, the capital of Hebei province.5 Originally the firm 
was state-owned and suffering from the financial crisis that affected many Chinese firms 
during the 1990’s with outdated equipment, an aging workforce, and a shrinking market 
contributing to the firm’s difficulties. The threat of bankruptcy led to ownership 
restructuring as an alternative solution to closure and the value of the firm’s assets was 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Wang (1995). 
5 Our confidentiality agreement with CHINATEXTILE prohibits us from revealing the 
actual name of the firm. 
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transferred completely to employees in 1998.6 During the study period the total labor 
force averaged about 3500 employees.   
We collected several kinds of data from the case. These were collected during a 
lengthy study period when we visited the firm twice and met with and interviewed the 
Director of Human Resources, the Director of the Weaving Division, a line supervisor 
and two team leaders at the Weaving Division, and the Director of Data Management 
(who was in charge of all internal data). In addition, to get perspective from an outsider, 
we also interviewed a long-term consultant for CHINATEXTILE who has been 
observing the firm for many years. As well as collecting various performance and 
personnel data, we also deepened our knowledge of the case by collecting data from a 
survey that we designed and administered to all team leaders.  
Our key data are a panel for all7 297 weavers who worked in CHINATEXTILE at 
any time during the 12 month period spanning the first week of April 2003 to the last 
week of March 2004.8 We chose this group of employees because an accurate objective 
measure of individual worker performance with little measurement error is available 
consistently for all workers during this period. In addition, we were able to match these 
worker performance data with weekly earnings data, using unique employee IDs.  
                                                 
6 Employee ownership has been extensively used in China as part of a strategy to 
restructure state firms. By some estimates at least one third of restructured firms have some 
degree of employee ownership (National Statistics Bureau, September 2002),  For a discussion of  
the role played by employee ownership in  Chinese firms see Tseo,  Hou , Zhang  and Zhang 
(2004). 
7 By having data for all weavers, we are able to respond to key selection concerns that 
often plague econometric studies in this area. 
8 There were actually a dozen of weavers in our data who worked for only one week and 
less than 15 hours during the week. We have no reliable performance data for such weavers.   
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Finally, we were able to secure additional personnel records and merge them into the 
performance data set.  
A quick glance at the weaving workplace gives observers a first impression that 
the role of weavers in the production process is rather limited since the operation appears 
to be fully automated and various fabrics are produced by automated looms rather than by 
individual weavers. However, a closer look at the workplace reveals that weavers have 
significant responsibilities. For example, problems (such as broken threads) do occur 
from time to time and each weaver’s main task is to pay close attention to her assigned 
loom machines (multiple loom machines are assigned to each weaver) and minimize the 
occurrence of such operational problems. If a problem does arise, each weaver is 
expected to solve the problem quickly and effectively. Good weavers will detect early 
signs of problems and make timely adjustments to the operational process so that 
problems will not fully materialize and hence no defective product will result. Should 
problems actually occur, the better weavers will solve them promptly and efficiently, so 
that there will be minimal production of defective output. Due to the problem-solving 
nature of their jobs, CHINATEXTILE constantly tells their weavers how important 
quality is, and implores them to work toward “zero defects”.  
In short, the nature of weaving technology and the problem-solving nature of a 
weaver’s job at CHINATEXTILE indicates that the most relevant and crucial 
performance measure for weavers is quality. Importantly, CHINATEXTILE granted us 
full access to each weaver’s weekly defect rate (percentage of defective output generated 
per week) for all 297 weavers who ever worked in the Weaving Division during the 12 
month study period spanning the first week of April 2003 to the last week of March 2004  
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As mentioned before, in 1998, CHINATEXTILE raised 28 million yuan of new 
capital by selling 26 million shares to their employees at the price of 1 yuan per share and 
held 2 million as collective shares. Share purchases were voluntary and employee 
shareholders received one free share for each share purchased. About 65 percent of all 
eligible employees decided to take the offer to become employee owners. The 
distribution of share ownership that emerged was considered to be too dispersed for 
effective incentives. Hence, with the approval by the employee congress, our case 
subsequently transferred 5 million shares to the board of directors (3 million shares were 
sold by employee owners and the remaining two million were sold from the collective 
share pool).  Presently there are 2,338 shareholders including 1,756 employees (80%), 
329 retirees (11.8%), and 253 former employees who have left the firm (8.2%). No 
employee became a new employee owner during the period under study. Currently the 
board of directors, consisting of 15 members, own 21.6% of all outstanding shares and 
the CEO, owns 16.4% (approximately 4.63 million yuan). Dividends have been 
distributed twice at the rate of 15% since 1998. Employee shares are transferable 
internally after being held for a period of 3 years. Share transactions are registered at the 
accounting office. Only a small number of shares have been sold by employee owners. 
CHINATEXTILE’s shareholder meetings are hold jointly with employee representative 
conferences, and the major decisions have been made, based on the rule of one share one 
vote.               
The HR director at CHINATEXTILE stressed that two key factors were involved 
in the determination of a weaver’s wage namely seniority and performance. Our 
subsequent wage regression analysis will reveal what the actual earnings data of 
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individual weavers tell us about pay determination when our primary measure of 
performance is a measure of product quality, the defect rate.   
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.  On average weavers make about 150 
yuan (about $20) per week. Each weaver’s average weekly defect rate is 0.25 percent.  
Though the magnitude of the defect rate appears small, “zero defect” is extremely 
difficult to achieve. In fact, during the 53-week period, no weaver was able to achieve 
“zero defect”. This also confirms our field observation that automated loom machines are 
far from perfect and problems do occur from time to time. Exclusive, focused and 
educated attention to these machines by weavers is indeed an integral part of a high-
performance workplace. TENURE (the length of service with the firm) is calculated by 
counting for each weaver how many weeks she has been with the firm since she started 
working at CHINATEXTILE.  Average tenure is found to be about 467 weeks.  
Furthermore, on average, 36 percent of weavers in the team are employee owners; and 37 
percent are urban registrants.   
 
III. Empirical Strategy and Results: Human Capital vs. Agency Theory 
We begin by estimating the simplest earnings-tenure profile equation with 
individual worker fixed effects to control for time-invariant worker heterogeneity (such 
as unobserved innate ability of each worker):  
(1)  ln(WAGE)it = α + βTENUREit + γTENUREit2  
+ (individual specific fixed effects) + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
Note that we also include 11 monthly time dummy variables to capture time-specific 
shocks to CHINATEXTILE that are common to all weavers. (There are actually 12 
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monthly time dummy variables from April 2003 through March 2004 but we use the 
April 2003 time dummy variable as a reference month.).   
The OLS estimates of Eq. (1) are reported in the first column of Table 2. The 
estimated coefficient on TENURE is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level, confirming the presence of upward-sloping earnings-tenure profiles for weavers at 
CHINATEXTILE, at least initially. The estimated coefficient on TENURE2 is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, pointing to diminishing return to 
seniority. This finding of upward-sloping earnings-tenure profiles for weavers at 
CHINATEXTILE is thus consistent with similar findings for diverse workers in many 
different countries and institutional settings.9  
We are now ready to present our main results. To test whether the estimated 
upward-sloping earnings-tenure profiles become flatter when we control for objective 
individual worker performance, we estimate  
(2)  ln(WAGE)it = α + βTENUREit + γTENUREit2 + ηDEFRATEit + λDEFRATEit2  
+ (individual specific fixed effects) + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
Note that we include the square term of DEFRATE to capture a possible non-linear 
relationship between DEFRATE and ln(WAGE).  
The last column of Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of Eq. (3). First, the 
estimated coefficient on DEFRATE is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, 
confirming our field notes from interviews with personnel at CHINATEXTILE that 
                                                 
9 For surveys of the empirical literature see for instance Hutchens (1989) and Topel 
(1991). The empirical literature appears to have been reenergized lately by the development of 
employer-employee matched data. Unfortunately the employer-employee matched data do not 
include information on individual worker performance, and hence do not allow for direct test of 
the relative validity of the human capital theory vs. the agency theory.    
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worker performance of individual weavers in the area of product quality is an important 
determinant of pay. The estimated coefficient on the square term of DEFRATE is 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level, supporting our prior expectation of 
diminishing return to performance, although the concavity of the earnings-performance 
curve is quite weak. In fact, the slope of the earnings-performance curve, assessed at the 
mean value of DEFRATE which is given by η+2λ(Mean of DEFRATE), turned out to be 
very close to the estimated coefficient on DEFRATE (η). Using the estimated slope of 
the earnings-performance curve assessed at the mean value of DEFRATE, we can gauge 
the magnitude of the sensitivity of pay to performance. For example, if the average 
weaver slacks off, pays less focused attention to her assigned loom machines, and hence 
her DEFRATE rises by one standard deviation (0.347), her weekly earnings will be cut 
by 8 percent.  
Second and most importantly the estimated coefficients on TENURE and 
TENURE2 in the last column of Table 2 are very close to those reported in the second 
column. It turns out that controlling for objective worker performance changes the slope 
of the earnings-tenure profiles very little. Hence our evidence favors agency theory over 
human capital theory.  
We produce Figure 1, based on the estimated coefficients on TENURE and 
TENURE2. The figure shows how the slopes of the earnings-tenure profiles change as 
weavers spend more time at the firm. Initially, one additional week of tenure will result in 
an increase of weekly earnings by 0.4 percent. As TENURE rises, returns to seniority 
will diminish. However, the pace at which returns to seniority diminishes is rather slow. 
According to our estimates, it will take 2,000 weeks (almost 40 years) for returns to 
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seniority to reach zero. Since as in most firms in China, there is mandatory retirement at 
CHINATEXTILE (60 for men and 55 for women), our finding favors Lazear (1979)’s 
explanation for mandatory retirement as a solution to senior workers making more than 
what they produce.          
 The rest of Table 2 shows the robustness of our results. It is plausible that higher 
wages cause better worker performance (for example, the efficiency wage hypothesis) 
rather than better performance causing higher wages. To account for possible reverse 
causality issue we run two additional regressions. First, we consider a lagged worker 
performance measure instead of a contemporaneous measure. As shown in the third 
column of Table 2, the results using the lagged worker performance measure are similar 
to those using the contemporaneous measure, pointing to the robustness of our key 
findings.  
Second, we consider an alternative specification in which we explicitly control for 
the efficiency wage effect on performance by adding DEFRATE and DEFRATE2 in the 
following week to Eq. (2). The last column of Table 2 shows the OLS estimates for such 
an alternative specification. The estimated coefficient on DEFRATE in the following 
week is negative and significant at the 1 percent level and, likewise, the estimated 
coefficient on DEFRATE2 in the following week is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level. As such, we find some evidence for the efficiency wage effect on 
performance (or higher weekly earnings this week will lead to better performance next 
week). Nevertheless, the estimated coefficients on DEFRATE and DEFRATE2 this week 
are still negative and positive respectively and both statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. In fact, a quick comparison between the second column and fourth column 
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of Table 2 reveals that the original estimates of Eq. (2) are robust to the inclusion of  
DEFRATE and DEFRATE2 in the following week. In other words, even after controlling 
for the efficiency wage effect, we still find evidence of a significant pay-performance 
link.   
Finally, to re-examine further our conclusion that upward-sloping earnings-tenure 
profiles have more to do with incentives than with human capital accumulation through 
on-the-job training, we estimate the performance-tenure profiles: 
(3)  DEFRATEit = α + βTENUREit + γTENUREit2   
+ (individual specific fixed effects) + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
The first column of Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of Eq. (4) (the linear specification 
is also reported). By finding no evidence of a significant performance-tenure link, this 
further confirms that the on-job-training human capital theory is less relevant to our 
weavers at CHINATEXTILE.  The rest of the table reports findings that explore if 
significant performance-tenure linkages are found by disaggregating all weavers into 
different groups (e.g., employee owners vs. non-employee owners as well as urban 
registrants vs. rural migrants). As shown in the table, the absence of a significant 
performance-tenure linkage appears to be universal.  
 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results: Effects of Ownership and the Urban/Rural 
Divide 
 Earlier we noted how agency theory implies that earnings-tenure profiles and pay-
performance sensitivities may differ between employee-owner workers and other 
workers. We also hypothesized how and why earnings-tenure profiles and pay-
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performance sensitivities might be expected to differ between urban registrants and rural 
migrant workers in China. Before examining such possible heterogeneity in pay 
determination more rigorously, we begin by comparing some key variables between the 
two groups of workers.  
 As shown in Table 4, TENURE of the average employee owner is about twice as 
long as that of the average non-employee owner (711 weeks vs. 328 weeks); and 
employee owners earn more than non-employee owners (152 vs. 144 yuan). On the other 
hand, there is no statistically significant difference in objective performance (DEFRATE) 
between employee owners and other weavers.  
 Turning to urban registrant and rural migrant weavers, those two groups of 
workers differ significant in all three areas: urban registrants have longer tenure (707 vs. 
323); earn more (151 vs. 144); and perform better (0.23 vs. 0.25) than rural migrant 
workers. In addition, there is an overlap between employee owners and urban workers 
(for example, 67 percent of employee owners are urban workers).  
To test whether earnings-tenure profiles and pay-performance sensitivities differ 
significantly between employee owners and other workers, we estimate the following 
augmented earnings equations with the relevant interaction terms:  
(4)  ln(WAGE)it = α + βTENUREit + γTENUREit2 + ηDEFRATEit + λDEFRATEit2  
+ βEESOPit*TENUREit + γ EESOPit*TENUREit2  
+ ηEESOPit*DEFRATEit + λ EESOPit*DEFRATEit2  
+ (individual specific fixed effects) + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
Likewise for the possible urban/rural divide, we estimate: 
(5)  ln(WAGE)it = α + βTENUREit + γTENUREit2 + ηDEFRATEit + λDEFRATEit2  
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+ βEURBANit*TENUREit + γ EURBANit*TENUREit2  
+ ηEURBANit*DEFRATEit + λ EURBANit*DEFRATEit2  
+ (individual specific fixed effects) + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
 Table 5 summarizes the OLS estimates of Eqs. (4) and (5). The estimated 
coefficient on an interaction term involving ESOP and TENURE is negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level and the estimated coefficient on an interaction term 
involving ESOP and TENURE2 is positive and also statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. The earnings-tenure linkage is significantly weaker for employee owners 
than for other weavers. In fact, the coefficient on TENURE for employee owners, which 
is equal to β + βE, also turns out to be not significantly different from zero. Likewise the 
coefficient on TENURE2 which is equal to γ + γ E, turned out to be also not significantly 
different from zero. In other words, earnings-tenure profiles for employee owners are not 
upward-sloping but horizontal. As such, our findings support the hypothesis that 
earnings-tenure profiles for employee owner workers (whose interests are better aligned 
with those of the firm) need not be upward-sloping to prevent them from pursuing their 
own interests at the cost of the well-being of the firm.  
 Regarding the pay-performance sensitivity, the estimated coefficient on 
ESOP*DEFRATE is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level and the 
estimated coefficient on ESOP*DEFRATE2 is negative and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. The absolute value of the coefficient on DEFRATE for employee owners 
(which is given by |η + ηE|) is considerably smaller (0.135 as opposed to 0.342) although 
still significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. Similarly, the absolute value 
of the coefficient on DEFRATE2 for employee owners (=|λ + λE|) is smaller (0.005 vs. 
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0.019) although still significantly different from zero. Using these coefficients, we 
calculate the sensitivity of pay to performance assessed at the mean value of DEFRATE 
for employee owners and other workers. The resulting pay-performance sensitivity 
estimates are 0.133(=0.135-0.005*2*0.241) for employee owners and 0.333(=0.342-
0.019*2*0.250) for other workers, implying that quality deterioration by one standard 
deviation (0.381 for employee owners and 0.326 for other workers) will be penalized 
with a wage cut of 5% for employee owners yet with a substantially greater wage cut of 
11% for other workers).    
In sum, the pay-performance sensitivity is found to be substantially weaker for 
employee owners than for other workers. Hence our findings provide support for the 
proposition that, since employee ownership tends to align the interest of employees with 
that of the firm, wages for employee owners need not be as sensitive to worker 
performance measures as the wage that for non-employee owners. In fact, total 
compensation for employee owners may well become excessively variable if the 
sensitivity of wage to worker performance were as high as that for non-employee owners.  
  Finally, the second column of Table 5 shows the OLS estimates of Eq. (5). The 
estimated coefficient on URBAN*TENURE is positive and statistically significant at the 
5 percent level and the estimated coefficient on URBAN* TENURE2 is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Earnings-tenure profiles are found to be 
considerably steeper for urban workers than for rural migrant workers at least initially.  
For example, initially one additional week of tenure will result in a 0.4-percent increase 
in weekly earnings for urban workers whereas one additional week of tenure will lead to 
a 0.2-percent rise in weekly earnings for rural migrant workers. Since the earnings-tenure 
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profiles are more concave for urban workers than for rural workers, the difference in the 
slope of the earnings-tenure profiles will eventually disappear (according to our 
estimates, the difference will disappear around 600 weeks of TENURE). In short, at least 
for the first 600 weeks, the earnings-tenure profiles are steeper for urban workers than for 
rural migrant workers, confirming our hypothesis that urban workers with better 
alternative employment opportunities need steeper earnings-tenure profiles to prevent 
them from shirking.  
 With regard to the pay-performance sensitivity, as expected, the estimated 
coefficient on URBAN*DEFRATE is positive and the coefficient on 
URBAN*DEFRATE2   is negative; both are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Using the same formulae as used for employee owners vs. other workers, the pay-
performance sensitivity assessed at the mean value of DEFRATE for urban workers is 
estimated to be 0.122 whereas for rural migrant workers it is estimated to be 0.328. A 
one-standard deviation increase in DEFRATE will be met with a penalty of a 3 percent 
wage cut for urban workers whereas a standard deviation increase in DEFRATE will 
result in a hefty penalty of a 13 percent wage cut for rural workers. In other words, 
findings support the hypothesis that rural migrant workers are faced with much stronger 
incentives to improve quality and to tolerate more variable earnings than urban workers. 
This suggests that rural migrant workers with lower quality schooling need to be made 
more aware of the importance of quality and to learn to improve quality than do urban 
workers and at the same time they will tolerate more variable earnings due to their much 
limited alternative employment opportunities than urban workers.        
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VI. Conclusions 
While the existence of upward-sloping earnings tenure profiles is one of the most 
often observed empirical regularities in the field of labor economics around the world, the 
explanation for this observed regularity remains highly controversial with sharp 
disagreement surrounding, in particular, the respective roles of human capital and agency 
theories. For the first time that we are aware of, we are able to use a large new panel of 
individual data, including objective measures of worker performance, and thus we are 
able to provide what we believe is some of the most rigorous evidence to date on three 
related dimensions of enduring debates surrounding upward-sloping earnings-tenure 
profiles.  
 Most importantly we provide the first direct test of the relative validity of human 
capital and agency explanations in accounting for upward-sloping earnings-tenure 
profiles; our findings strongly support the agency view. Our second area of interest 
concerns employee ownership (and many workers at our case are employee owners.) 
Consistent with agency theory we find that earnings-tenure profiles for employee owners 
are not upward-sloping but horizontal. In addition we find that pay-performance 
sensitivities are substantially weaker for employee owners than for other workers. Finally 
we investigate the impact of residential policies in China. We find that again consistent 
with the agency view, earnings-tenure profiles are considerably steeper for urban workers 
than for migrant workers with far more limited alternative employment opportunities. 
At the same time we are aware that ours is a case study and that one must be 
cautious in generalizing findings, especially to other institutional contexts. Equally, we 
note that there are other areas in which a significant set of econometric case studies has 
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provided important contributions with broadly similar findings. One example is the work 
on the effects of piece rates (e.g. Lazear, 2000, Kleiner and Helper, 2003, Fernie and 
Metcalf, 1999, Paarsh and Shearer, 1999, Knez and Simester, 2001, and Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul, 2005.) As more studies based on disaggregated data sets similar to 
that gathered from CHINATEXTILE become available, we await to see whether a pattern 
of evidence on the nature and determinants of earnings-tenure profiles emerges that 
corroborates the picture presented in this paper. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Variable Definition Mean S.D. N
WAGE weekly earnings 146.740 32.905 10082
TENURE length of service with CHINATEXTILE (in weeks) 466.517 301.158 10082
DEFRATE percent of defective cloth produced per week (%) 0.247 0.347 10082
ESOP =1 if the weaver owns the stock of the firm, 0 otherwise. 0.363 0.481 10082
URBAN =1 if the weaver is registered as an urban resident, 0 otherwise. 0.374 0.484 10082
Source: All data provided by CHINATEXTILE. Data are for 297 weavers at CHINATEXTILE 
during the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004. 
Note: All summary statistics are based on a pooled cross-sectional time series dataset on 297 weavers
over the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004. 
Table 2 Fixed Effect Estimates of the Earnings-Tenure Profiles
(Dependent variable=log of WAGE)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
TENURE 0.0049 ** 0.0021 0.0043 ** 0.0021 0.0036 * 0.0020 0.0036 * 0.0021
TENURE2 -0.000001 *** 0.0000003 -0.000001 *** 0.0000003 -0.0000005 * 0.0000003 -0.0000009 *** 0.0000003
DEFRATE -0.263 *** 0.016 -0.218 *** 0.017
DEFRATE2 0.014 *** 0.001 0.012 *** 0.001
DEFRATE-1 -0.189 *** 0.015
DEFRATE-1
2 0.009 *** 0.001
DEFRATE+1 -0.043 *** 0.017
DEFRATE+1
2 0.003 *** 0.001
R2 0.378 0.395 0.368 0.378
N 10082 10082 9785 9785
Source: All data provided by CHINATEXTILE. Data are for 297 weavers at CHINATEXTILE 
during the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004. 
Notes:
All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  
***statistically significant at the 1% level 
**statistically significant at the 5% level 
Table 3 Fixed Effect Estimates of the Performance-Tenure Link
(Dependent variable=DEFRATE)
X=ESOP X=URBAN
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
TENURE 0.0004 0.0022 -0.00002 0.00221 0.0002 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0022 0.0004 0.0022 0.0001 0.0022
TENURE2 0.0000004 0.0000003 0.0000004 0.0000005 0.0000004 0.0000005
X*TENURE 0.0006 0.0004 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0004 -0.001 0.001
X*TENURE2 -0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001
R2 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.410
N 10082 10082 10082 10082 10082 10082
Source: All data provided by CHINATEXTILE. Data are for 297 weavers at CHINATEXTILE 
during the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004. 
Notes:
All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  
Table 4 Employee Owners and Urban Weavers
ESOP=1 ESOP=0 URBAN=1 URBAN=0
Variable Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
WAGE 152.067 *** 30.972 3656 143.709 33.583 6426 150.892 *** 31.427 3767 144.263 33.515 6315
TENURE 710.753 *** 224.645 3656 327.562 245.646 6426 707.278 *** 277.562 3767 322.899 208.909 6315
DEFECT 0.241 0.381 3656 0.250 0.326 6426 0.234 *** 0.270 3767 0.254 0.386 6315
Source: All data provided by CHINATEXTILE. Data are for 297 weavers at CHINATEXTILE 
during the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004. 
Note: All summary statistics are based on a pooled cross-sectional time series dataset on 297 weavers
over the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004. 
***statistically significant difference between the two groups at the 1% level 
Table 5 Fixed Effect Estimates of the Wage-Performance Link and Wage-Tenure Profiles: 
ESOP workers vs. non-ESOP workers and Urban vs. Rural Workers
(Dependent variable=log of WAGE)
X=ESOP X=URBAN
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
TENURE 0.0047 ** 0.0021 0.0038 * 0.0021  
TENURE2 -0.0000012 *** 0.0000004 -0.00000014 0.00000051    
DEFRATE -0.342 *** 0.020 -0.337 *** 0.020
DEFRATE2 0.019 *** 0.001 0.018 *** 0.001
X*TENURE -0.0024 ** 0.0010 0.0022 ** 0.0009
X*TENURE2 0.0000016 ** 0.0000008 -0.0000018 ** 0.0000007  
X*DEFRATE 0.207 *** 0.031 0.200 *** 0.032
X*DEFRATE2 -0.014 *** 0.003 -0.014 *** 0.003
R2 0.399 0.398
N 10082 10082
Source: All data provided by CHINATEXTILE. Data are for 297 weavers at CHINATEXTILE 
during the 53-week period from the first week of April, 2003 to the last week of March, 2004. 
Notes:
All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  
***statistically significant at the 1% level 
**statistically significant at the 5% level 
Figure 1 The Slopes of the Earnings-Tenure Profiles
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